I. Moralizing and Shmoralizing (EPV, 1-4)
   A. Why does Blackburn find Mackie’s moralizing troublesome in the light of his error theory? (1-2)
   B. Blackburn considers the claim that Mackie is not moralizing, but doing something very similar to that, but different in meaning (call it shmoralizing) because of his rejection of objectivity for moral values. Why does Blackburn think this claim is wrong? How does the distinction Blackburn draws between the practice or activity or moralizing and our theories about that activity help him to make the case that Mackie is, indeed, moralizing (and that there really is no such thing as shmoralizing)? (2-4)

II. The Problem of Unasserted Contexts and our Right to Objective Moral Expression (189-196)
   A. What is the problem of unasserted contexts and why is it a problem for an expressive/projective theory of moral expressions? (189-191)
   B. How does our concern with the interaction among attitudes explain why we would want to put expressions of attitude in conditional statements? (192-193)
   C. In what way do we have a “concept of improvement and deterioration in sensibility”? How does this concept entail that we need a mode of expression to express “uncertainty that one’s own attitude of approval can itself be endorsed”? (194)
   D. How does the foregoing considerations (B-C) show that the occurrence of moral expressions in indirect contexts only “proves us to have adopted a form of expression adequate to our needs” in a way that is consistent with a projective account of such expressions? (195) How does this remove “the temptation to think that our surface forms of expression embody a mistake” and our “right” to such expressions? (196)

III. Quasi-Realism and Obligation (“Errors and the Phenomenology of Value,” 4-11)
   A. Why does our sense of obligation appear to be a particularly difficult
problem for Blackburn’s projectivism? (6-7)

B. The problem of obligation as a problem of the *explanation* of moral psychology. (7-8)

1. How does Blackburn propose that projectivism explain our sense of obligation using the story of Mabel and Fred?

2. How does Blackburn argue that any “extra ingredients the realist adds” to this explanation are superfluous, pull no explanatory weight?

C. The problem of obligation as a problem of the *justification* of moral psychology (8-10)

1. How does the projectivist explanation of our sense of obligation raise the threat that there are no obligations *really*? (8-9)

2. How does Blackburn play with the story of Mabel and Fred (turning it into a story about our sense of what is funny rather than our sense of obligation) to suggest that a projectivist explanation of obligation need not undermine our sense of obligation? (9)

3. How does Blackburn argue that a projectivist explanation of our sense of obligation will only threaten to undermine the force of our sense of obligation when that sense of obligation is coupled with particular beliefs about what is worthy of respect? How does Blackburn suggest that we shouldn’t see this potential for undermining the force of our sense of obligation as a problem? (9-10)

D. How does Blackburn answer the “nagging feel that on this metaphysic ‘there are no obligations, etc. *really*’?

1. Why does Blackburn believe that the projectivist “affirms *all that could ever properly be meant* by saying that there are real obligations.”?

2. How does his appeal to mathematics help him to make the above point?