Roderick Chisholm, “Human Freedom and the Self”

I. The Metaphysical Problem of Human Freedom (26-28)
   A. What is the “metaphysical problem of human freedom”? (26)
   B. Why does Chisholm believe that an act cannot be “entirely up to the man himself” if that act is caused by the desires and beliefs of the agent? (26-27)
   C. Why does Chisholm think a really good person can only be praised for her/his goodness if s/he is able to do what is bad in addition to the good s/he actually does? (27-28)

II. What does Chisholm believe is wrong in Moore’s attempt to spell out how determinism is compatible with being able to do otherwise than we did? (28-29)

III. Why does Chisholm believe human responsibility is inconsistent with indeterminism? (29-30)

IV. Agent Causation (30-34)
   A. How does Chisholm distinguish agent from event causation? (30-31)
   B. How does Chisholm respond to the objection that an agent who moves her/his hand does something to her/his hand, but does not do something to her/his brain? (31-32)
   C. How does Chisholm respond to the objection that there is nothing in the notion of agent causation that distinguishes it from something happening by itself? (32-33)
   D. Why does Chisholm believe that “if we are responsible . . . we have a prerogative some would attribute only to God”? (34)

V. Desire and Action (34-37)
   A. Why does Chisholm believe that “there can be no science of man”? (34-35)
   B. What is problematic about saying that our desires may “incline without necessitating”? (35-37)