Harry Frankfurt, “Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility”

I. The Principle of Alternate Possibilities and the Case of Jones and the Threat (167-171)
   A. What is the principle of principle of alternate possibilities (PAP)? (187)
   B. In what way does PAP gain credibility through its association with the idea that coercion and moral responsibility are mutually exclusive? (168)
   C. How does the case of Jones and the threat establish that we can hold someone responsible for their actions despite their having no alternate possibilities? (169-170)
   D. How does the case of Jones and the threat help us to see that “when we excuse a person who has been coerced, we do not excuse him because he was unable to do otherwise”? (170-171)

II. The Case of Jones and Black (171-176)
   A. How is it possible, according to the objection on p. 172, that Jones could have done otherwise? (172)
   B. How does the case of Jones and Black show that Jones can be responsible for his action even though he could not, in any sense, have done otherwise? (172-174)
   C. Why is it important to Frankfurt that a person who could not have done otherwise might not have acted as he did because he could not have done otherwise? (174-175)
   D. How does Frankfurt consider revising PAP in a way that would still make moral responsibility incompatible with determinism? Why does he reject this revision, offer instead another revision that makes responsibility compatible with determinism? (175-176)