Preface: How does Kymlicka define libertarianism, distinguishing it from other right-wing kindred spirits in the political marketplace today? (Kymlicka, “Libertarianism”, pp. 95-96) This is the sense of libertarianism we will be studying in Nozick’s work.

I. Nozick’s “Distributive Justice”

A. What are the three topics Nozick considers appropriate for a theory of justice as a theory of entitlements to deal with? What does he mean in speaking of his theory of justice as a theory of entitlements? (150-153)

B. Justice in Transfers

1. End-State and Patterned Principles of Justice (153-160)
   a. What does Nozick mean in speaking of an end-state principle of justice? Would Rawls’s theory of justice qualify as an end-state theory?
   b. What is a patterned principle of justice? (hint: a patterned principle is a particular kind of end-state principle)
   c. Why does Nozick believe liberty is inconsistent with end-state principles of justice? How does the story he spins about Wilt Chamberlin help him to make his point?

2. Self-Ownership (167-174)
   a. Why does Nozick believe redistributing wealth through taxation is equivalent to forced labor?
   b. How do end-state principles of justice effect a “shift from the classical liberals’ notion of self-ownership to a notion of (partial) property rights in other people”? (172)

C. Justice in Acquisitions (174-182)

1. What is Locke’s theory of how we acquire property rights in something that is initially unowned?

2. How does Nozick understand Locke’s proviso to his theory of property acquisition? What does he mean when he speaks of making someone “worse off”?

3. Why does he believe property holdings under capitalism cannot be said to have made anyone “worse off” and, hence, is property that was justly acquired according to Locke’s theory of property?

II. Kymlicka’s Critique of Nozick (“Libertarianism”)

A. Kymlicka’s Critique of Nozick’s “Intuitive” Argument: the Wilt Chamberlain Example (98-103)

1. What problems does Kymlicka find with Nozick’s Wilt Chamberlain argument? Why does he believe that it would not be accepted as valid by, for example, a Rawlsian?
2. What is the significance of his observation that “Nozick has persuasively drawn on our intuitions about acting on our choices, but his example ignores our intuition about dealing fairly with unequal circumstances.”

B. Kymlicka’s Critique of Nozick’s Argument from Self-Ownership (103-125)

1. The Inadequacy and Arbitrariness of Nozick’s understanding of the Lockean Proviso (112-117)
   a. Why does Kymlicka consider Nozick’s understanding of the Lockean proviso inadequate in only making reference to the material welfare of those affected by property acquisition? (112-113)
   b. Why does Kymlicka consider Nozick’s understanding of the Lockean proviso arbitrary in only making reference to the state prior to the acquisition of property in determining whether someone has been made “worse off” by that acquisition? (114-117)

2. Nozickean Capitalism does not respect Self-Ownership (118-125)
   a. How does Kymlicka distinguish between a formal and substantive sense of self-ownership/self-determination?
   b. How does he argue that Nozick must be concerned with the substantive sense of self-ownership in order for his argument against the welfare state to stick?
   c. How does he argue that a liberal (Rawlsian) social regime does a much better job of respecting everyone’s substantive sense of self-ownership than a libertarian (Nozickean) regime?
   d. What is the significance of his statement that “Liberal redistribution does not sacrifice self-determination for some other goal. Rather, it aims at a fairer distribution of the means required for self-determination”? (122)