The Usual Concept of Truth (115-120)

How is truth usually understood as a matter of the accordance of a thing and our idea of a thing?

The Inner Possibility of Accordance (120-123)

A. It is obvious what it means for two things to be in accord, say, two coins that look like one another. But what could it mean to say that a coin and a true statement we make about a coin our ‘in accord’? What is Heidegger’s quandry here?

B. In what way does our true statement about the coin make it present?

C. In what way does the ability of my statement about the coin to make it present presuppose what Heidegger calls an “open region” (121) in which it can be made present?

Freedom and Truth (123-130)

A. In what sense is freedom, for Heidegger, the essence of truth?

B. How does he understand freedom as “letting beings be”? What is he trying to specify about the sense of freedom he is getting at as the essence of truth with this peculiar phrase?

C. What does Heidegger mean when he writes, “Man does not ‘possess’ freedom as a property. At best, the converse holds: freedom, ek-sistent, disclosive Da-sein, possesses man...”? (127)

D. What does Heidegger mean point out by appealing to the original Greek word for truth, alethia? What does a reflection on that Greek term reveal to us about the meaning of truth, as Heidegger understands it?

E. What does Heidegger mean when he writes, “Precisely because letting beings always lets beings be in a particular comportment which relates to them and thus discloses them, it conceals being as a whole.”? (129-130) In what way does the unconcealment of beings which is the essence of truth presuppose a concealment of Being?

Truth, Untruth and Errancy (130-138)

A. What does Heidegger mean when he claims that “The proper non-essence of truth is the mystery”? (130) What does this mystery have to do with the concealment of Being that he spoke of as the other side of the unconcealment of beings which is truth?

B. What does Heidegger mean in speaking of Dasein as “insistent”? (132) How is this connected with the “errancy” he attributes to Dasein?

C. In what way does the possibility of “experiencing errancy” open up the possibility that we not “be led astray”? (134)

D. How is philosophical thinking, as Heidegger understands it, a “gentle releasement” to the truth of Being? (135) Why the emphasis on a language of passivity here, speaking of our “releasement” to Being in this way?